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We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe …. [in which] law and 
narrative are inseparably related.  Every prescription is insistent in 
its demand to be located in discourse – to be supplied with history 
and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.  And 
every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, 
its moral.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his Foreword to the 1982 Supreme Court Term, Robert Cover 
memorably explored the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob 
Jones University v. United States.2  At issue in the case was the right 
under the Constitution’s Religion Clauses of a private university, 
established “to conduct an institution of learning … giving special 
emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy 
Scriptures,” to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial 
marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating.  Prior to 
1970, the Internal Revenue Service had granted tax-exempt status to 
private schools without regard to their racial admissions policies. But 
on the basis of a “national policy to discourage racial discrimination in 
education,” the IRS decided in 1970 that it could no longer justify 
allowing tax-exempt status to private schools that practiced racial 
discrimination and revoked Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status.  
 
† Professor of Law and Director, International and Comparative Law Program, 
University of Maryland School of Law.  
1. Robert Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative,” 97 Harvard Law Review 4, 4-5 (1983).  
2. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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Delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Burger held 
that a compelling government interest “in eradicating racial 
discrimination in education” substantially outweighed whatever burden 
the denial of tax benefits placed on the university’s exercise of its 
religious beliefs.  The political authority exercised by the IRS in 
interpreting the tax code to reflect this policy was not therefore 
unconstitutional.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice relied on two 
interrelated doctrinal propositions to reject the claim to religious liberty 
made by the university under the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.  The first proposition concerned the nature and scope of 
the right to religious liberty: 
This Court has long held the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be an 
absolute prohibition against governmental regulation of religious beliefs. As 
interpreted by this Court, moreover, the Free Exercise Clause provides substantial 
protection for lawful conduct grounded in religious belief.3  
The second proposition concerned permissible grounds for limiting this 
right for reasons of compelling “public policy”: 
However, ‘[n]ot all burdens on religion are unconstitutional …. The state may justify 
a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an 
overriding governmental interest.’  On occasion this Court has found certain 
governmental interests so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting 
religiously based conduct …. Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a 
substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent 
those schools from observing their religious tenets.4  
The ambiguities internal to this dualistic structure are instantly 
familiar to any student of religious freedom jurisprudence, whether in 
national or international law.  The first dilemma for the Court was how 
to address the constitutional relationship between the state and a paideic 
religious community (the central concern in Cover’s Foreword,5) in this 
 
 3. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
 4. Ibid. 
 5. In the “paideic” world of the nomos, law is a resource in the larger effort of a 
community to endow life with meaning.  As an ideal-type, it suggests: “(1) a common 
body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being educated 
into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the 
individual and his community work out the implications of their law.”  This is a 
vision of a “strong community of common obligations” characteristic, for example, 
of Talmudic law and Christian conceptions of the Church where reciprocal 
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case a conservative Evangelical university.  This raised a host of 
contested questions which ultimately implicated the normative 
foundations of the American constitutional order itself.   
In this constitutional nomos, the Establishment Clause stipulates 
the prescriptive relation between the state and “religion.”  The key 
concept in the political imaginary is “religious disestablishment.”  
Unlike in Spain or Italy, there can be no concordat between the state and 
federations of religious institutions, and unlike in many Muslim 
majority countries there can be no recognized State or dominant religion 
or set of recognized minority religions.  Most pertinently, and in direct 
contradiction to the English constitution, there can be no official or 
established Church.6  Rather, religion in America must be “free”: a 
matter of essentially private life and personal conviction and belief.  As 
James Madison in 1785 memorably expressed the idea: 
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that Religion or the duty which 
we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence.” The Religion then of every man must be left 
to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to 
exercise it as these may dictate.7 
On this account, a particular conception of the true nature or 
“essence” of religion is understood as prior to and ineluctably entangled 
with the right to “free exercise” under the Constitution. This essence 
encompasses a notion of “religious belief” whose location is internal to 
the being of a distinct religious subject: the individual for whom religion 
is understood on two levels simultaneously: first, theologically as 
“interiorized” in terms of individual “belief or conscience;” and second, 
constitutionally as “freely chosen” in terms of the fundamental right to 
subjective authority.   
This is a recognizably Protestant conception of religion: the idea 
that “conscience was directly bound to obey and follow God and not 
men: a theory of the free and at the same time unfree conscience (as the 
 
obligations flow from commitment, not coercion, because people recognize the needs 
of others and respond to them.  Cover, supra n. 1, at __. 
 6. American religious pluralism had its origins within the British Empire which 
made any notion of a common Church in the North American colonies an historical 
impossibility: see Evan Haefeli, “Toleration and Empire: The Origins of American 
Religious Pluralism,” in British North America in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (Stephen Foster ed., 2013).  
 7. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(June 20, 1785).  
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‘work of God,’ as Luther had said).”8  Viewing religion as belief or 
conscience is recognizably modern and Christian because “it 
emphasizes the priority of belief as a state of mind rather than as 
constituting activity in the world.”9  In this respect, the object of the 
right to religious freedom is, at its core, a conception of religion 
understood primarily as “a set of beliefs in a set of propositions (about 
transcendence, causality, cosmology) to which an individual gives 
assent.”10  In modern religious freedom jurisprudence, this is the forum 
internum: the right of the individual subject to “have or adopt” a religion 
or belief that is considered to be absolutely protected from interference 
by the law, i.e., is nonderogable and not subject to limitation by the 
state.11   
Recall again Chief Justice Burger’s statement in Bob Jones 
University: “This Court has long held that the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to be an absolute prohibition against 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs.”12  Some version of this 
proposition is present in all cases arising under the Religion Clauses.13 
 
 8. Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics 
189 (2014). 
 9. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam 47 (1993). 
 10. Saba Mahmood, “Can Secularism Be Other‒wise?,” in Varieties of 
Secularism in a Secular Age 283 (Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen and 
Craig J. Calhoun eds., 2010).  See also Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a 
Secular Age: A Minority Report 15 (2016) (“the concept of religion as belief is itself 
part of a normative secular framework in which religion is disinvested of its 
materiality.”) 
 11. The conceptual division between a forum internum and externum is present in 
all the modern international human rights instruments: see, e.g., International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 9(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 12(1), 
July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to 
change one’s religion or beliefs”). 
 12. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (my emphasis). 
 13. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (internal 
citations omitted) (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right 
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First 
Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as 
such.’ The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the 
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Strikingly similar versions appear also in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights interpreting Article 9(1) of the 
ECHR.14  
In the American political imaginary, this understanding of 
religion famously induced Tocqueville to observe that “[t]he Americans 
combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their 
minds, that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the 
other.” The result was that “there are things which religion prevents 
them from imagining and forbids them to become …. Religion, which 
never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should 
therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions.”15 
For present purposes, the critical point is that the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses, and two centuries of associated 
constitutional rights doctrine,16 are inextricably tied to and shaped 
 
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on 
the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the other 
side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”); Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At a minimum, the 
protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates 
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is 
undertaken for religious reasons”); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 
642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in … religion, or other matters of 
opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”) 
 14. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) ¶ 14 (1993) (Martens J) (“The basic principle in human rights is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom. Essential for that dignity and that freedom are the 
freedoms of thought, conscience and religion enshrined in Article 9 para. 1. 
Accordingly, they are absolute. The Convention leaves no room whatsoever for 
interference by the State. These absolute freedoms explicitly include freedom to 
change one’s religion and beliefs. Whether or not somebody intends to change 
religion is no concern of the State’s …”); Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., June 29, 2004, at ¶ 104 (“The Court reiterates that, as enshrined in 
Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a 
‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its 
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity 
of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned …. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom 
to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion.”)  
 15. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 292 (J. P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1969) (1851). For this reason, “politics is free to dance lightly on 
the surface of life only because everything fundamental is fixed below it. The 
American imaginary is determined outside of politics.” William E. Connolly, 
“Tocqueville, Religiosity, and Pluralization,” in The Ethos of Pluralization 163, 169 
(1995). 
 16. See, e.g. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (“the 
‘establishment of religion’ clause … means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
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within a background Protestant discursive tradition.17  This tradition is 
metaphysical in its structure and combines a complex series of not only 
ontological but also theological claims within a rationalist discourse 
built upon the two core notions of subjective right and secular reason.  
It is to these two complex and elusive concepts we can now turn.  
II. THE MODERN SUBJECT 
The first core claim of religious freedom discourse is ontological 
in nature.  Strictly speaking, the claim is not directly about religion per 
se. Rather, it concerns the subject whose religion it is, i.e. the individual 
for whom religion is an object of “belief” or “conscience” on the one 
hand, and “free choice” on the other.  The notion today that the right to 
religious freedom is neutral towards “religion,” or protects “all religions 
equally,” is criticized in the literature across a wide array of disciplines.  
Rather, it is more accurate to say that the right to religious freedom 
purports to treat all rights-holders equally.  
In this move, however, a seismic shift occurs in the relationship 
between conceptions of subjectivity, normativity (and its sources) and 
authority.  The modern picture is ontologically grounded not in any 
divine conception of heteronomous religious authority, but in a knowing 
moral or rational subject viewed as the self-grounding source of 
normativity itself.18  It is now the individual who, as a matter of right, 
 
Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”) 
 17. The notion of an historically evolving set of discourses embodied in the 
practices and institutions of a society and thus deeply embedded in the material life 
of its people is central to the conception of a discursive tradition: 
These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was 
instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper 
performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that 
practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should be 
modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other 
practices, institutions, and social conditions).  
Talal Asad, “The idea of an anthropology of Islam,” Occasional Paper Series, Center 
for Contemporary Arab Studies (1986) at 14.  
 18. For Kant, enlightenment was the discovery of an exit, a “way out,” a “process 
that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’” where religious authority takes the 
place of our conscience by a “modification of the preexisting relation linking will, 
authority, and the use of reason.”  Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” in 
The Foucault Reader 35 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). 
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decides for herself (as a matter of authority) questions of religion, 
conscience or belief (now viewed as an object of choice or assent).   
In this series of reconfigurations, religion becomes rationalized 
in accordance with a distinctive normative model of religiosity as 
privatized belief in a set of creedal propositions to which an autonomous 
individual gives assent.  This simultaneous rationalization and 
privatization of religion generates the distinctive and unstable co-
imbrication of autonomy and belief as the “buffered” self chooses 
autonomously as a matter of moral right and believes freely as a matter 
of theological conviction.19  
Virtually all contemporary accounts of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief trace the genealogies of this modern picture to the 
legacies of nominalism, the collapse of medieval scholasticism, and the 
ensuing intellectual influence of the Protestant Reformation, humanism, 
and the civil and philosophical Enlightenments.20  As Michael Allen 
Gillespie has powerfully argued, the origins of the modern concept of 
right lie most centrally in the ontological individualism proclaimed 
against scholasticism by the nominalist revolution at the end of the 
medieval period.21  For Gillespie, the nominalist revolution on the 
“problem of universals” provided a schema for an entirely new 
understanding of time and being.  
Drawing drew upon Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle, 
what most centrally characterized the via antiqua of scholasticism was 
ontological realism: i.e. the “belief in the extra-mental existence of 
universals … [such that] species and genera were the ultimately real 
things and individual human beings were merely particular instances of 
these universals.”22  Such universals were “nothing other than divine 
reason made known to man either by illumination, as Augustine had 
 
 19. For discussion of the co-imbrication of autonomy and belief in religious 
freedom discourse, see Peter G. Danchin, “Islam in the Secular Nomos of the 
European Court of Human Rights”, 32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 663 (2011).   
 20. The most prominent recent example is Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (2007).  
See also Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in 
Early Modern Germany (2001). 
 21. It is for this reason that the tendency of much modern liberal rights theory to 
locate its origins and justification in eighteenth century (usually Kantian) 
Enlightenment thought is incomplete and misleading, especially as regards its 
theological origins and continuing dialectic entanglements.    
 22. Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity 20 (2008).  
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suggested, or through the investigation of nature, as Aquinas and others 
had argued.”23   
This ontological realism had three main consequences: First, 
“nature and reason reflected one another” in a rational structure.  
Second, while God transcended his creation, he “was reflected in it and 
by analogy could be understood through it” with the result that “logic 
and natural theology could supplement or, in the minds of some, even 
replace revelation” (with obvious implications for modern natural law 
theory). And third, man was a “natural being with a natural end and was 
governed by the laws of nature” such that he “did not need Scripture to 
inform him of his earthly moral and political duties,” although Scripture 
was “necessary to understand everything that transcended nature, 
including man’s supernatural destiny.”24 
On the scholastic view, the ultimate source of normative order 
was divine and all rights, duties and obligations of man were defined 
internally to this order.25  As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, this 
conception of normativity, whether placed within a classical or theistic 
framework, had two dominant characteristics: first, some account of the 
essence of man as a rational animal; and second, some account of the 
human telos.  The purpose of practical reason was therefore to “instruct 
us both as to what our true end is and as how to reach it.”26 
 
 23. Ibid. 
 24. Ibid.  
 25. Koskenniemi describes the main features of international law in medieval 
thought as follows: 
‘[O]rder’ was a natural state of affairs, existing by the force of creation and 
discoverable in the natural arrangement of things and men through faith or 
recta ratio.  If doubt arose, it could always be dismissed by appeal to the 
Church’s or the Emperor’s authority.  Behind this authority stood the 
Christian idea of a civitas maxima which both legitimized and 
constitutionalized it.  Different institutions exercised powers in a system of 
mutual control, each submitted to legitimation proceeding ‘downwards’ 
from the highest commands of divine law.  
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument 56-7 (1989). 
 26. Alistair MacIntrye, “Why the Enlightenment Project Had to Fail,” in After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory __ (1981).  In the case of ethics placed within a 
theistic framework of divinely ordained law, whether that be Aquinas in the Christian 
tradition, Maimonides in the Jewish tradition or Ibn Roschd in the Islamic tradition, 
the “threefold structure of untutored human nature, human nature as it could be if it 
realized its telos, and the precepts of rational ethics as the means of transition from 
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In the history of Western legal thought, this understanding of the 
normative grounds for law is illustrated as much by St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s hierarchy of eternal, natural, human and divine positive 
law,27 as by modern accounts of the emergence in the mid-seventeenth 
century of public international law and a new system of secular 
sovereign states.28   
As Gillespie suggests, the realist ontology of scholastic thought 
was shattered by the via moderna of nominalism which viewed only 
individual things as real and universals as mere fictions: “words did not 
point to real universal entities but were merely signs useful for human 
understanding.”29 Reacting against the growth of Aristotelianism, 
including importantly the commentaries of the Islamic philosophers 
Avicenna and Averroes, nominalists such as Duns Scotus and William 
of Ockham emphasized the divine omnipotence of God giving birth to 
the conception of a voluntaristic as opposed to rational God.  For 
Ockham, faith alone confirmed that God is omnipotent with the result 
that “every being exists only as a result of his willing it,” while creation 
is radically particular and non-teleological — “an act of sheer grace.”30  
Accordingly, there is “no immutable order of nature or reason that man 
can understand and no knowledge of God except through revelation.”31  
On Gillespie’s reading, the nominalist revolution had three main 
ontotheological effects: First, God remained a necessary being (all other 
beings being contingent creations of His will), but the nature of God was 
fundamentally altered. The nominalist God was “frighteningly 
omnipotent, utterly beyond human ken, and a continual threat to human 
well-being,” thus epitomizing “divine power and unpredictability rather 
 
one to the other, remains central to the theistic standing of evaluative thought and 
judgment.”  Id. __. 
 27. St. Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics (2nd ed., trans. Richard J. 
Regan, ed. William B. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, 2002) (On Different Kinds 
of Law). 
 28. This historical juncture at the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is said 
to mark the “great epistemological break” when religious medieval “unity” gave way 
to a secular system of “plural” territorially-limited sovereign states.  Between the 16th 
and 18th centuries, this led to the emergence of what Koskenniemi has termed the 
“liberal doctrine of politics,” the driving force of which was the attempt to “escape 
the anarchical conclusions to which loss of faith in an overriding theologico-moral 
world order otherwise seemed to lead.” Koskenniemi, supra note 25, at 52. 
 29. Gillespie, supra note 22, at 14. 
 30. Ibid. 22. 
 31. Ibid.  Human beings “thus had no natural or supernatural end or telos.” The 
result was that “the nominalist revolution against scholasticism shattered every 
aspect of the medieval world.” Id. 14. 
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than divine love and reason.”32  The period of modernity arises as a 
complex series of attempts to find a way out of this 
metaphysical/theological crisis.  In particular, the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant would later figure 
centrally in modernity’s search for just such a “way out.”33 
Second, the two great intellectual movements that arose in 
response – humanism and the Reformation – agreed on the premise but 
differed on which of the two realms of being, man and God, was 
ontically primary. Humanism “put man first and interpreted God and 
nature on this basis,” while the Reformation “began with God and 
viewed man and nature only from this perspective.”34   
And third, the radical freedom of divine will gave new 
importance to human will.  Luther accepted the premises of ontological 
individualism, but rejected the problem of the impenetrability of the 
nominalist God. Reconfiguring the relationship of human and divine 
will by viewing faith alone, as opposed to philosophy, as the will to 
union with God, i.e. right willing dependent on God, he was able to 
“transform the terrifying God of nominalism into a power within 
individual human beings,” such that “God becomes the interior and 
guiding principle of [man’s] life, or what Luther calls conscience.”35  
These profound effects of nominalism both underlie and ground 
the ontological claims of modern religious freedom discourse in making 
the individual the subject of the right and belief or conscience its object. 
For Martin Heidegger, the most decisive transformation from medieval 
thought to modernity is from Aristotle’s hupokeimenon (the “underlying 
thing” or substance in a thing, i.e. that which is constant and real) to the 
Cartesian notion of the subjectum as ego: 
According to the metaphysical tradition from Aristotle onwards, every true being is a 
hupokeimenon. This hupokeimenon is determined afterwards as subjectum.  Descartes’ 
thinking distinguishes the subjectum which man is to the effect that the actualis of this 
subjectum has its essence in the actus of cogitare (percipere).36 
 
 32. Ibid. 15. 
 33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 34. Gillespie, supra note 22, at 17. 
 35. Ibid. 33-34. (My emphasis.) 
 36. Martin Heidegger, “Metaphysics as History of Being,” in Nietzsche II, 1939-
46 (vol. II) at 31.  
 PETER G. DANCHIN   11 
The result is that since Descartes, the human “I”—with its new 
dimension of perceptive activity—has come to be the “subject” in 
metaphysics. This conceptual architecture generates the familiar 
ontological metaphysics of rights discourse in seeking to define the 
essence of religion as such, understood as what is common to all 
religious subjectivity.37  On the basis of the brief genealogy sketched 
out here, this essence is broadly understood today under the category of 
“inner faith” or “belief.” 
III. SECULAR REASON 
What is striking and maddeningly elusive is how this rights-
based metaphysics simultaneously enfolds within it a second, 
theological claim regarding not the essence, but existence of all beings, 
understood as that which is the highest or supreme, all-founding being.38  
Following Kant’s use of the term,39 Heidegger argued that the entire 
history of Western metaphysics is “ontotheological” in structure in the 
sense that it makes two ambiguous and historically intertwined 
foundational claims: first, in ontologically grounding an understanding 
of beings “as such”; and second, in theologically legitimating our 
 
 37. The ontological claim involves a search for the most general ground of beings, 
i.e. what all beings share in common.  This “exemplary being” is understood in terms 
of “that being beneath or beyond which no more basic being can be ‘discovered’ or 
‘fathomed.’”  Iain Thomson, “Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger’s 
Destruktion of Metaphysics,” 8 International Journal of Philosophical Studies 297, 
301-2 (2000). 
 38. This second claim seeks to answer the question of “[w]hich being is the 
highest (or supreme) being, and in what sense is it the highest being?”  The 
theological claim itself thus has two aspects in “striving to identify the highest or 
supreme being (the question of God), but [also] … to understand the being of God 
(that is, the sense in which God ‘is’, or the kind of being which God has).”  The 
theological claim in this way “inquires into and would give an account (logos) of the 
existence of the theion, ‘the supreme cause and the highest ground of beings’.” Ibid. 
302 
 39. Before Heidegger, Kant was the first to use the term “ontotheology”. He 
distinguished between theology derived from reason on the one hand and revelation 
on the other.  Within the category of the former (“reasoned theology,”) he further 
distinguished between natural theology and transcendental theology.  Natural 
theology was divided as between physico-theology and ethical/moral theology, while 
transcendental theology was divided between cosmotheology and ontotheology. For 
Kant, ontotheology was “the type of transcendental theology characteristic of 
Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological argument which believes it can know the 
existence of an original being [Urwesen], through mere concepts, without the help 
of any experience whatsoever”. Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: 
Technology and the Politics of Education 7 (2005). 
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changing historical understanding of the source or “totality” of these 
foundational claims.40 
Heidegger’s guiding idea is that in answering the question of 
reality’s ultimate foundation, the metaphysical tradition establishes 
“both the fundamental and the ultimate conceptual parameters of 
intelligibility”.41  The result is that 
[a] series of metaphysical ontologies anchor our successive constellations of historical 
intelligibility, temporarily securing the intelligible order by grasping it from both ends 
of the conceptual scale simultaneously (as it were), both ontologically (from the inside 
out) and theologically (from the outside in).42 
This second, theological strand of metaphysics seeks to explain and 
legitimate the ultimate source or foundation of rights discourse itself 
and its theological structure does not disappear in modernity’s self-
understanding of the transition from divine to secular conceptions of 
reason.  Despite the ontological consensus on the individual as the 
modern subject of the right, the ontic differences discussed above 
between humanist and Reformation thinkers as well as between rival 
religious communities and confessions played a significant role in the 
devastating wars of religion that completely shattered Europe in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
This set of theological debates was the precursor to the “civil 
Enlightenment” of the early modern period in Europe which predated 
the philosophical Aufklärung of Kant by more than a century.  In 
response to the devastating wars of religion, the civil philosophers 
sought to desacralize the state and this led over time to both the churches 
losing their civil and political authority and the gradual spiritualization 
of religion in the form of individual “conscience and belief.”43   
Importantly, however, this conception did not rest on any form 
of subjective right of individuals against the State.  Rather, for civil 
philosophers such as Christian Thomasius it comprised a right of the 
 
 40. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962). 
 41. Iain Thomson, “Ontotheology,’ in Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays 
109 (Daniel O. Dahlstrom ed., 2011). 
 42. Ibid. 
 43. Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in 
Early Modern Germany 376 (2001) (arguing that in the civil tradition “it is religion 
and morality that define the private domain, their inward and unenforceable character 
defining the kingdom of truth,” while the public sovereign domain is defined by the 
use of coercion to preserve social peace). 
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state against intolerant religious communities.44 The juridical 
construction of religious freedom in the early modern period thus sought 
to establish political neutrality toward ultimate theological principles as 
the condition of establishing parity of legal treatment for rival religions 
as equally valid legal associations.45  This marked a shift in the 
understanding of religious authority as Erastian control of churches by 
the State was effected to deny the coercive authority of religious 
institutions in enforcing the demands of conscience.46  This was the 
condition of freedom in the newly emerging private sphere – a sphere 
defined, protected, delimited and increasingly regulated by the State 
itself. 
In this sequence of moves it is important to see how, at the 
ontological level, normativity is now conceived in terms of radically 
individual beings while, at the ontic level, a radically free God retains 
authority in relation to such beings.  Faith on this account is subjective, 
a matter of voluntary belief, not knowledge.  This is what the 
“privatization” of religion refers to, although not yet its rationalization 
and loss of authority to the master modern principle of autonomy.   
The crucial point for present purposes is that the nominalist 
ontology of radical individuality lies at the origin of the modern division 
between knowledge and belief.  It was now possible to have true belief 
about God, and God’s action, on the basis of God’s own self-revelation 
as received by faith, but it is not possible to have knowledge of such 
matters. While man and God exist independently of our thinking about 
them, we can only have knowledge of the former.  Well before 
 
 44. Negotiated and contingent relations between the state and different religious 
communities, groups and traditions is quite distinct from the notion of “a right” 
which implies a legal/moral relation between the state and an individual subject as 
rights-holder, as well as a background justification not only of the right itself but its 
distinctive function of holding others to correlative duties.   
 45. See Ian Hunter, “Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology, 
Philosophy, and Legal Casuistry,” 113 South. Atl. Q. 37 (2014);  
 46. Central to this strategy was the category of adiaphora: the old Stoic idea of 
actions that morality neither mandates nor forbids, which within Christianity was 
understood to refer to matters regarded as inessential to faith but nevertheless 
permissible for Christians or allowed in the Church.  On this basis Thomasius 
declared “virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its liturgies, sacraments 
and theological doctrines — to be morally indifferent with regards to salvation” 
while at the same time holding that “forms of worship were a matter of ‘Christian 
freedom’ to be left to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent they posed 
no threat to social peace.”  Ian Hunter, “Religious Offences and Liberal Politics: 
From the Religious Settlements to Multi-cultural Society,” 9 (2005). 
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liberalism then, the category of “conscience or belief” is contingent on 
the ontological individualism proclaimed by nominalism.   
In contemporary theology, this thesis has been carefully 
expressed and elaborated in the work of John Milbank who identifies 
John Duns Scotus (1265-1308), and his notion of “univocity of being,” 
as being the first major thinker to influence medieval thought away from 
Thomas Aquinas’s “analogy of being.”  As Milbank argues: 
Now this [late medieval nominalist] philosophy was itself the legatee of the greatest 
of all disruptions carried out in the history of European thought, namely that of Duns 
Scotus who for the first time established a radical separation of philosophy from 
theology by declaring that it was possible to consider being in abstraction from the 
question of whether one is considering created or creating being. Eventually this 
generated the notion of ontology and an epistemology unconstrained by, and 
transcendentally prior to, theology itself.
47 
MacIntyre in After Virtue similarly observes that the Jansenist 
Pascal recognized that the Protestant conception of reason was at one 
with the conception of reason in seventeenth century philosophy and 
science.  Reason no longer comprehended essences or transitions from 
potentiality to act, such concepts belonging to the despised conceptual 
scheme of scholasticism. Rather, reason was calculative and could 
assess truths of fact and mathematical relations, but nothing more.48   
In anticipation of Hume, Pascal thus recognized that “a central 
achievement of reason is to recognize that our beliefs are ultimately 
founded on nature, custom and habit.”  But as regards ends, “it must be 
silent.”49 In retaining the negative aspects of this conception, “reason 
for Kant, as much as for Hume, discerns no essential natures and no 
teleological features in the objective universe available for study by 
physics.”50 
These shifts in the conceptualization of reason have significant 
implications for our understanding of the contemporary nature and 
limits of religious freedom jurisprudence. In any legal dispute involving 
 
 47. Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology 23 (John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock 
and Graham Ward eds., 1999).  
 48. MacIntyre, supra note 26, at __. 
 49. Ibid. 
 50. Ibid. Similarly, “Diderot, Smith and Kierkegaard reject any teleological view 
of human nature, any view of man as having an essence which defines his true end.” 
Id. 
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claims not to religious belief per se, but to religious traditions such as 
halakhah or sharia—discursive traditions of religious knowledge, 
hermeneutics and practice—what is most at stake in such cases is 
ineluctably shaped by background assumptions concerning the ontology 
of the right itself.  Does, for example, the meaning of the term 
“conscience” differ if considered internally to halakha or sharia-based 
traditions of thought and deliberation?51  Further, if “religion” is the 
proper object of the right, how can we speak meaningfully today of 
entire discursive traditions encompassing their own sources, 
justifications and hermeneutics and thus conceptions of religious 
identity, membership and practice as being the object of such a right? 
If for the scholastics God was the source of normative order and 
man’s rights were conceived internal to that order, following the 
nominalist revolution either man or nature became the ontological 
source of secular right and God, now understood as radically free, stood 
in an entirely new relation to this normative order.  This conceptual shift 
is well illustrated in Locke’s empiricist epistemology which led to a 
conception of civil power as directed to the regulation of things that can 
be “objectively known,” whereas religious belief was relegated to the 
status of “subjective conviction.”52   
By the eighteenth century, however, this early modern civil 
philosophy was gradually superseded by the Kantian philosophy of the 
Enlightenment.  Locke’s idea of religion as a subjective belief which is 
unable to be coerced because located in a private mental space marks 
the beginning of a new religious psychology and corresponding shift 
from the privatization of heteronomous religious authority to its 
normative interiorization and subordination to the rationalist principle 
of autonomy.   
 
 51. Regarding halakha, see R (on the application of E) v. The Governing Body of 
JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.), discussed in Peter G. Danchin and 
Louis Blond, “Unlawful Religion? Modern Secular Power and the Legal Reasoning 
in the JFS Case,” 29 Maryland Journal of International Law 414 (2014); regarding 
sharia, see Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003), 
discussed in see Danchin, supra note 19.  
 52. For Locke, the neutrality of civil law with respect to religion and the truth of 
particular religious practices was guaranteed epistemologically by relegating 
religious belief to the “realm of speculation.” It was the “discursive separation from 
other-worldly concerns” that therefore underpinned the capacity of civil discourse to 
convert incommensurable expressions of religious “difference” into a politically 
indifferent “diversity” of religious practices. Kirstie McClure, “Difference, 
Diversity, and the Limits of Toleration,” 18 Political Theory 361, 385 (1990). 
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As Talal Asad suggests, it is the idea that the mind is the 
impregnable bastion of true religious experience that provides the 
modern view with its plausibility, i.e. that coercion of religious belief is 
irrational because impossible.  Given that force can only secure an 
insincere profession of faith and outward conformity, true authenticity 
rests on the modern subject’s ability to choose her beliefs and act on 
them.53  This conception of belief as singular and inaccessible to other 
locations reinforces the idea of an autonomous “buffered” subject able 
to separate itself from objects by contemplation, reasoning and 
interpretation and choose from available beliefs.54  
This intellectual disposition and sensibility prefigures the 
modern liberal tradition whereby the public sphere is reconceived in 
terms of a moral theory of justice and religious liberty grounded in a 
complex and unstable notion of a subjective right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and belief.  This conception derives most centrally from 
Kant’s transcendental idealism which simultaneously rationalized 
religion and sacralized reason in a morally grounded State.55  Consistent 
with the ontotheological structure of metaphysics, the former grounds 
the core ontological claim of modern religious freedom discourse, while 
the latter justifies the ultimate conceptual parameters of intelligibility in 
a radically new conception of secular reason.56  
If in the early modern period God was understood as radically 
free, now freedom itself was reconceived as the source of normative 
order (autonomy in the form of the self-legislating moral law) and God 
became understood as an idea or concept internal to practical reason 
 
 53. Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” in Is Critique 
Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech 44-5 (Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, 
Judith Butler and Saba Mahmood eds., 2009). 
 54. Taylor, supra note 20, at 35-95 (discussing the shift from the “porous” self, 
vulnerable to external forces, spirits and demons, to the new Reformed “buffered” 
self, a “disciplined and free agent living in a progressively disenchanted world.”) 
 55. See Danchin, supra note 19, at 710-15. 
 56. The modern drive to secure the authority of secular reason in the public sphere 
has both a visceral and political sense: visceral in reiterating the “Christian and 
Kantian demands to occupy the authoritative place of public discourse,” and political 
in response to the fear that a “non-Kantian, religiously pluralized world would fall 
into either disorder or religious tyranny if its participants did not endorse a single 
standard of rational authority, regardless of the extent to which such a standard can 
in fact be secured transcendentally.” William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist 
38-9 (1999).  
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itself (pure rational faith).57  Religion was thus now subject to the 
panoptic demands of morality and the forum internum was reconceived 
from a sphere of non-interference in freely chosen conscience to a 
sphere of autonomous choice of any belief at all (religious or not).  
As William Connolly notes, the idea of a “self-sufficient public 
realm fostering freedom and governance without recourse to a specific 
religious faith” encountered from the start three major dilemmas. First, 
the equation of religion with belief or conscience clearly derives form a 
Western Christian genealogy that is at odds with the core tenets of non-
Western religious traditions such as Islam in which Muslims regard 
themselves more as claimed by a religious community they have not 
chosen and which foreground strongly the role of embodied practices 
within religious life.58  
Second, the tendency to elide freedom of conscience with 
autonomy fatally undermines the normative basis for according freedom 
of conscience in the first place.59  And third, the Kantian question of 
how to secure secular authority in the public sphere remains haunted by 
the twin charges of abstraction (how any conception of reason can have 
standing to judge the limits and competence of reason itself) and 
hypocrisy (the apodictic recognition of morality in virtue of a shared 
universal rationality being seen instead as merely a “secondary 
formation reflecting the predominant Christian culture in which it is 
set.”)60  
 
 57. “The commanding subject is God [where] … this commanding being is not 
outside man as a substance different from man.” Kant, Opus Postum. For Insole, this 
is a quasi-theological proposition: “our giving to ourselves the moral law has the 
mark of divinity, such that, in a sense, we are God-like in this function.  We have a 
sort of theoisis, where human beings become transformed in the image of God; but 
where God disappears into the human being as this happens.” This theoisis in fact 
“eclipses God, rather than being an increasing participation in God.” Christopher J. 
Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem 170 (2013). 
 58. As scholars such as Saba Mahmood argue, the result is that “secular 
epistemologies cannot grasp the way that Islam articulates religious values, 
misconstruing both the Islamic subject and the public meanings of its religious 
practices.” 
 59. See Michael J. Sandel, “Religious Liberty: Freedom of Choice or Freedom of 
Conscience,” in Secularism and Its Critics 84-5 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998)  
(observing that “[t]he respect this neutrality commands is not, strictly speaking, 
respect for religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or respect for the 
dignity that consists in the capacity to choose one’s religion freely,” with the result 
that “[n]ot all religious beliefs can be redescribed without loss as ‘the product of free 
and voluntary choice by the faithful’”). 
 60. In claiming that freedom consists in the acceptance of what reason dictates as 
duty, Kant made three critical philosophical moves: first, he elevated a generic 
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IV. CONCLUSION: DIALECTICS OF THE RIGHT 
The genius of modern religious freedom discourse is to combine 
these two metaphysical strands of ontology of the modern subject and 
theology of secular reason within a single concept of “right.”  
Accordingly, the two guiding ideas of modern doctrine are, on the one 
hand, religious freedom conceived as a universal human right and, on 
the other, the neutrality of the public sphere towards religion, with each 
thesis axiomatically defined in terms of the other.    
The secular neutrality of the political order is thus said to be 
secured by the guarantee to protect the universal right to religious 
liberty.  In this move, the disciplinary structure and secular practices of 
the public sphere combine to produce the believing subject and 
concomitant post-Protestant conceptions of religion (especially in 
relation to scripture and rituals) and religious subjectivity (especially as 
regards moral and ethical sensibilities).  Conversely, the universality of 
the right is said to be secured by the neutrality of the public sphere 
towards religion.  This requires the state ceaselessly to recognize or limit 
claims regarding the manifestation of religious belief and practice which 
in turn generates the distinctive entanglement of religion and law in 
different domains of the public and private spheres. 
This double-structure necessarily generates two interrelated 
paradoxes.  For the reasons discussed above, by defining the secular 
neutrality of the public sphere in terms of the right to religious freedom, 
the authority of religion is privatized relative to state authority and its 
normativity interiorized relative to individual subjectivity.  Second, and 
as a result, religious freedom is secured through subordination of 
religion to the secular power and public reason of the sovereign state.  
By defining the meaning and scope of freedom protected by the right in 
terms of secular neutrality, the claims of individuals and communities 
 
Christianity (“rational religion”) above sectarian faith, anchoring it in a “metaphysic 
of the supersensible” that binds moral agents simply in virtue of their rationality; 
second, in order to secure the authority of moral philosophy over theology, he 
reduced moral judgment to practical reason alone; and third, while he retained the 
“command model of morality of Augustinian Christianity,” Kant shifted the 
“proximate point of command from the Christian God to the moral subject itself.”  
Connolly, supra note 56, at 31-3.  See further Danchin, supra note 19, at 683-5. 
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to religious liberty are in fact limited through a continuing praxis of 
legal recognition and regulation.61  
We see this dialectic at work in the reasoning of Chief Justice 
Burger in Bob Jones University.  Nothing permits the government to 
interfere with or regulate the university’s “religious beliefs,” which 
remain absolutely protected from state intervention in the private 
sphere.  Consistent with the constitutional right to free exercise, nor will 
the government restrict “lawful conduct grounded in religious belief.” 
But where an “overriding governmental interest” can be shown, the state 
may justify a limitation on religious liberty, including even “regulations 
prohibiting religiously based conduct.”62 
This oscillating dialectic between the neutrality of secular reason 
and universality of individual right defines how modern doctrine 
functions as a technology of secular governance and is integral to the 
power of the modern nation-state.63  We see this in three key areas. First, 
in the foundational distinction between the forum internum on the one 
hand, defined as the locus of religious belief and conscience ostensibly 
protected absolutely by law, and the forum externum on the other, where 
the outward expression or manifestation of this belief is subject to state 
regulation and limitation.   
Second, in debates concerning the proper subject of the right and 
whether this can include collective subjects and actually-existing 
systems of religious law adhered to by both majority and minority 
religions.64  And third, in cases where conflicts of value arise between 
two or more claims internal to the right to religious liberty itself, i.e. 
 
 61. For a comprehensive discussion of this legal praxis, see Danchin and Blond, 
Unlawful Religion?, supra note 51.  
 62. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 63. Peter G. Danchin, “Religious Freedom as a Technology of Modern Secular 
Governance,” in Institutionalizing Rights and Religion: Competing Supremacies 
(Leora F. Batnitsky and Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017). 
 64. Note the latent uncertainty in Bob Jones University whether a private religious 
university, as opposed to its individual members or a “Church”, can assert a right in 
the forum internum to religious liberty. The Court states that “[w]e deal here only 
with religious schools - not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here, 
the governmental interest is in denying public support to racial discrimination in 
education.”  This indeterminacy regarding the proper subject of the right is a 
recurring dilemma in Religion Clause cases.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 
U.S. 171 (recognizing a “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination law in relation 
to religious institutions). 
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where both sides to a dispute frame their arguments as a claim to 
religious freedom.65  
Not only will the nature and scope of the forum internum be 
fiercely contested in all such cases, but so too will any restrictions on 
the manifestation of religion in the forum externum under rubrics such 
as “public order” (reflecting the early modern “civil Enlightenment” 
genealogy of securing social peace between rival religious factions) and 
the “rights of others” (reflecting the later philosophical Enlightenment 
genealogy of Kantian autonomy).  
What is increasingly recognized is that this double-structure of 
the right over time generates its opposites.  While the forum internum is 
purported to be sovereign and inviolable, it actually authorizes the 
state’s continual intervention in order to determine its meaning and 
scope.66  As Hussein Agrama has observed, the separation between 
private inner belief and public outer act or expression is in fact  
reunited through a suspicion of motives of material interest or worldly power. In the 
context of the freedom of religious belief, it becomes imperative to determine whether 
acts or expressions of belief are genuinely religiously motivated. This presumes the 
power to pronounce upon, and if necessary probe into, the character of one’s private 
convictions.67 
For this reason, “secularism’s power may lie more in the underlying 
question it continually provokes and obliges us to answer, than in the 
normativity of the categories it proposes.” 68 
 
 65. See Peter G. Danchin, “Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and 
the Conflict of Rights in International Law,” 49 Harvard International Law Journal 
249 (2008). 
 66. Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report 3 
(2016) (arguing that “political secularism is the modern state’s sovereign power to 
reorganize substantive features of religious life, stipulating what religion is or ought 
to be, assigning its proper content, and disseminating concomitant subjectivities, 
ethical frameworks, and quotidian practices.”) 
 67. Hussein Ali Agrama, “Religious Freedom and the Bind of Suspicion in 
Contemporary Secularity,” in Politics of Religious Freedom (Winnifred Fallers 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin eds., 2015). 
In Religion Clause cases, the courts routinely determine whether “religious acts or 
expressions are sincerely held to be essential to one’s religion”, and whether “these 
acts and expressions are authorized and mandated by orthodox religious texts.” Id 
(citing Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (2005)).  
 68. Hussein Ali Agrama, “Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a 
Secular or Religious State?,” 52 Comparative Studies in Society and History 495, 
500 (2010). 
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Similarly, the continuing praxis in public law of recognition 
or limitation of religious liberty claims of individuals and communities 
over time privileges the values and commitments of the religious 
majority as the norm against which the religious practices of the 
minority are judged and sanctioned in the forum externum.  The rights 
discourse and laws of national and international legal systems alike are 
thus primary sites for the construction and dissemination of particular 
modular conceptions of religiosity and religious subjectivity.  
Importantly, this dissemination occurs not only in non-
Western societies whose level of secularity is often questioned, but 
also those regarded as paradigmatically secular such as the United 
States and the states of Western Europe. For this reason, the problems 
of religious intolerance and discrimination cannot be understood solely 
as a product of cultural and social values, but must address how 
modern technologies of secular governance and dialectics internal to 
the right to religious freedom contribute to their ongoing vitality in 
modern societies.69 
 
 69. This is the argument in Saba Mahmood and Peter G. Danchin, “Immunity or 
Regulation? Antinomies of Religious Freedom,” 113 South Atlantic Quarterly 129 
(2014) (arguing that the right to religious liberty in practice often legitimates rather 
than alleviates discriminatory practices of the state against religious minorities and 
that this paradox haunts the jurisprudence of Egyptian and other courts in post-
colonial contexts as much as the European Court of Human Rights).   
